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Abstract—In conventional mobile data plans, the data is associated with a fixed period (e.g., one month) and the unused data will be
cleared at the end of each period. To take advantage of consumers’ heterogeneous demands across different periods and meanwhile
to provide more time flexibility, some mobile data service providers (SP) have offered data plans with different lengths of period. In this
paper, we consider the data plan design problem for a single SP, who provides data plans with different lengths of period for consumers
with different characteristics of data demands. We propose a contract-theoretic approach, wherein the SP offers a period-price data
plan contract which consists of a set of period and price combinations, indicating the prices for data with different periods. We study the
optimal data plan contract designs under two different models: discrete and continuous consumer-type models, depending on whether
the consumer type is discrete or continuous. In the former model, each type of consumers are assigned with a specific period-price
combination. In the latter model, the consumers are first categorized into a finite number of groups, and each group of consumers
(possibly with different types) are assigned with a specific period-price combination. We systematically analyze the incentive
compatibility (IC) constraint and individual rationality (IR) constraint, which ensure each consumer to choose the data plan with the
period-price combination intended for his type. We further derive the optimal contract that maximizes the SP’s expected profit,
meanwhile satisfying the IC and IR constraints of consumers. Our numerical results show that the proposed optimal contract can
increase the SP’s profit by 35%, comparing with the conventional fixed monthly-period data plan.
Index Terms—Mobile Data Plan; Time Flexibility; Data Contract Design; Contract Theory
F
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background and Motivation
The fast development and wide adoption of smart phones
and tablet devices not only drive the explosive growth of
mobile data consumption, but also increase the consump-
tion fluctuation over different plan periods [2]. Convention-
ally, each data plan specifies data cap for a specific period,
which is usually one month. The unused data will be cleared
at the end of the period, and the overused data will be
charged an additional fee. Hence, the consumers with large
consumption fluctuation over different periods (e.g., those
having frequent trips) will suffer a large utility loss, because
the overused data cannot be compensated by the leftover
data in the previous periods.
To deal with this problem, researchers in both academia
and industry have proposed many data pricing schemes [3],
[4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. However, these pricing schemes do
not fully take advantage of users’ heterogeneous demands
across periods. Seizing this opportunity, some major mobile
data service providers (SP) including AT&T [10] and T-
mobile [11] have launched a novel data plan called rollover
data plan, where unused data from the monthly plan al-
lowance rolls over for one billing period.
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The rollover data plan provides customers more time
flexibility by decreasing the frequency of clearing unused
data from once per month to once every two months. How-
ever, the two-month’s time flexibility may not be enough for
the consumers with highly varying data demand. In order
to provide time flexibility to more types of customers, we
propose a new type of data plan, which specifies the length
of period. As a simple example, an SP can offer multiple
data plans to consumers, e.g., 1GB for every month with
a price of $30 per month, 6GB for every six months (i.e.,
with average data cap 1GB per month) with a price of $32
per month, and 12GB for every year (i.e., with average
data cap 1GB per month) with a price of $35 per month.
Such data plans can benefit different types of consumers.
On one hand, the consumers with highly varying data
demand may prefer the data plan with a long period (which
provides more time flexibility and can potentially reduce
the uncertainty of data demand). On the other hand, the
consumers with rarely varying data demand may prefer the
data plan with a smaller period (which can reduce the total
cost due to the lower unit price). In such a scenario, a natural
problem for the SP is how to design a proper set of data
plans to maximize its expected profit. The problem is chal-
lenging due to (a) the information asymmetry between the
SP and consumers and (b) the difficulty in discriminating
consumers.
1.2 Key Results and Contributions
In the first part of this paper, we propose a contract-
theoretic mechanism for a single SP for discrete-consumer-
type model. The SP offers a contract consisting of a set of
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2period-price combinations, where each period-price com-
bination is designed for a specific type of consumers with
a specific data demand distribution. Contract theory has
been widely applied in solving economics, marketing and
network problems [12] [13], and is a useful tool in designing
incentive compatible (IC) and individual rational (IR) mech-
anism [14] to elicit the private information of end users. In
this work, we adopt the contract theory to solve the SP’s
profit maximization problem under information asymme-
try. Specifically, we first provide the IC and IR constraints
for the feasible contract to guarantee the truthful demand
information revelation of consumers, based on which we
further derive the optimal contract that maximizes the SP’s
expected profit.
In the second part of the paper, we extend our study to a
more general mechanism, which is designed for continuous-
consumer-type model. In this case, providing a period-
price combination for each consumer type is equivalent
to providing infinite combinations, which is not realistic
and not consumer friendly. Therefore, our mechanism for
continuous consumer types includes the procedure of di-
viding users into groups according to their types. Then, we
design limited pairs of period-price combinations, where
each combination is designed for a group of consumers. It
is very challenging to use a limited period-price combina-
tion to model the infinite consumer types, which usually
leads to an NP-hard problem [15]. Therefore, an alterna-
tive maximizing algorithm is introduced to find a sub-
optimal solution. In the algorithm, we alternatively update
the period assignments and group boundaries in order to
maximize the SP’s total profit. The main challenge of this
method lies in the step of updating group boundaries with
fixed period assignment due to the non-convexity of the
problem. However, by exploiting the unimodal structure of
the objective function, we can obtain the sufficient condition
for the optimal solution and show that sufficient condition
is satisfied for different scenarios.
The main contributions of the paper are as follow.
1) Novel Model: We study the SP’s mobile data plan
design problem from the perspective of data period,
which provides consumers with more time flexibil-
ity. To our best knowledge, this is the first work that
systematically studies such a new data plan design
perspective.
2) Novel Method: We propose a novel period-price data
plan based on the contract theory. Rather than spec-
ifying a price for each data cap in conventional data
plans, our proposed data plan specifies a data price
for each data period. A higher price is associated
with a longer data period.
3) Systematic Solution: We first analyze the period-
price contract for discrete-consumer-type model,
and then extend the analysis to a more gen-
eral model with continuous-consumer-type. In
continuous-consumer-type model, we assume that
the consumer type follows a continuous distribution
but the SP offers only a limited number of contract
items, which is different from traditional continu-
ous modeling in contract theory. In both cases, we
analyze the feasibility (incentive compatibility and
individual rationality) of the proposed period-price
contract systematically, based on which we further
derive the optimal contract that maximizes the SP’s
profit.
4) Performance Evaluation: We compare our proposed
optimal contract with the conventional monthly-
period scheme through numerical simulations. Nu-
merical results show that our proposed contract can
increase the SP’s profit over 35%.
1.3 Related Literature on Data Pricing Schemes
The survey by Sen et al. in [3] reviewed the past pricing pro-
posals and discussed several potential research problems.
There are mainly three categories of methods to alleviate
the problem of monthly data plan inflexibility: (1) Shared
Data Plan [4] [5] allows sharing data quota among multiple
devices or users, and hence to decrease the average unit
usage cost. (2) Sponsored Data [6] [7] is offered by the content
service providers, to sponsor the end users for the traffic
of viewing their content. (3) Secondary Data Trading [8] [9]
is proposed by the service providers, which allows users
to trade their unused mobile data with each other. How-
ever, all the above methods have their own disadvantages.
Shared data plan does not fully take advantage of the
heterogeneous demands across plan periods, because there
exists possibility that everyone in the shared data is in the
peak month. Sponsored data is too specific to the contents,
because not every content provider is willing to provide this
sponsorship. Secondary data trading is not convenient for
operation, since the consumer has to buy or sell every time
when he is running out of data or has data left unused.
The papers [16], [17], [18], [19], [20] are the pioneer
works that study the rollover data plan. Zheng et al. in [16]
evaluated the benefits of rollover data for both SPs and users
as well as identify the types of users who would upgrade to
rollover data plans. Wang et al. in [17] and [18] analyzed the
interactions between an SP and its subscribed users under
both traditional and rollover data plans. In [19] and [20],
they further analyzed the competitive market with multiple
SPs offering rollover data plans with fixed rollover period
(i.e., one month). However, none of them considers the
design of data plans from the dimension of length of period.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first paper
that systematically studies a data plan design regarding the
length of period.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
first analyze the optimal contract for discrete-consumer-type
model in Section 2 and Section 3. Specifically, we present
the system model and formulate the problem in Section 2.
We analyze the feasibility of the contract and propose the
optimal contract in Section 3. We analyze the generalized
contract for continuous-consumer-type model with group
division in Section 4. Performance evaluation is illustrated
in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
2.1 Service Provider Modeling
In the conventional data plans, the SP provides a unique
period choice (e.g., one month). In those data plans, each
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Fig. 1. An example of the contract of data plans.
consumer can consume data up to a quantity of q during one
period. In our proposed data plans, the SP offers multiple
data plans with different plan periods, and we denote the
length of the period as t (t ∈ (0,+∞)). 1
To sharpen the insights of plan periods, we assume
that all the data plans are with the same data cap q for
a unit time period. Figure 1 is an example of the contract
of data plans provided by the SP. In the contract, the SP
offers a set of combinations, where each combination (also
called a contract item) corresponds to one data plan. In each
combination, there is a period t and a corresponding unit
period price pi(t). In other words, a consumer who chooses
the contract item {t, pi(t)}, needs to pay a price tpi(t), and
can consume data up to a quantity of tq in a period of
t. Intuitively, the unit period price pi(t) is an increasing
function of t, because a larger period provides more time
flexibility for consumers.
We define the cost for the SP as the average expense of
providing a data plan of period t with data cap tq. Here, we
denote the total expense of a data plan of period t as tC(t),
where the cost (i.e., average expense for one period) C(t) is
formulated as follows
C(t) = W (t) + C0,
where C0 is the fixed cost (e.g., the fixed monthly spec-
trum license fee for providing service and the infrastructure
maintenance cost) and W (t) is the time-specific cost. We
can show that W (t) is monotone increasing on t. This is
because with a smaller t, the SP can better predict and hence
schedule the demand of consumers. We further assume that
W (t) grows more rapidly with larger period t, which means
Wtt(t) ≥ 0.2 Then, we can see Ct(t) > 0 and Ctt(t) ≥ 0.
The SP’s profit comes from selling data plans with differ-
ent periods. We use R(t) to denote the unit period profit of
SP from the data plan {t, pi(t)}, which is the gap between
the unit period price pi(t) and the unit period cost C(t), i.e.,
R(t) = pi(t)− C(t).
1. For presentation convenience, in the rest of the paper, we use
“period t” to refer to “period with length t”, and use ”unit period” to
refer to ”period with length 1”. We assume that t can be any positive
number, so that it is possible to provide any time flexibility.
2. gx(.) denotes the first order derivative of g(.) with respect to
x (∂g(.)/∂x). gxx(.) and gxy(.) denotes ∂2g(.)/∂x2 and ∂2g(.)/∂x∂y
respectively.
2.2 Consumer Modeling
We assume consumer i’s data demand per unit period fol-
lows normal distribution with density function f(x|µi, σi),
where µi is the mean and σi is the standard deviation 3.
In our paper, we focus on the demand fluctuation over
unit periods, so our design of contract is based on σ,
i.e., standard deviation of consumers’ data demand per
unit period. Therefore, in our modeling, we assume that
consumers are divided into different groups with different
average monthly demand µ, and we only design contract for
a particular group with a certain µ. Hence, we assume that
every consumer has the same µ and different σ. For writing
convenience, we call a consumer as a type-σ consumer if the
standard deviation of his data demand is σ. We first assume
that the consumer types follow a discrete distribution, and
the SP aims to design a specific contract item for each
consumer type.4 We denote the set containing all consumer
types as Σ. Due to the properties of the normal distribution,
when a period of the data plan is changed from 1 unit period
to a period of t, a consumer’s total data demand within a
period still follows normal distribution. The parameters of
this normal distribution are as follows: the mean value of
the consumer’s total data demand within t months is tµ,
and the standard deviation is
√
tσ. 5
We use V (σ, t) to denote the valuation of a type-σ con-
sumer for the contract with period t. Similar to [24], for a
given period t with data cap tq, we define the unit period
valuation V (σ, t) as a linear function on the average data
consumption per unit period:
V (σ, t)=α
(
µ− 1
t
∫ +∞
tq
(x− tq)f(x|tµ,√tσ)dx
)
=α
(
µ− 1
t
∫ +∞
√
t∆q
σ
(
√
tσx− t∆q)f(x|0, 1)dx
)
, (1)
where α > 0 is a predefined parameter, which represents
the valuation of unit data, and is identical for all con-
sumers. For writing convenience, we define ∆q = q − µ.
We assume the cost of usage exceeding data cap is very
large, so that the consumption will not exceed the data cap
tq. Hence, the average data consumption per unit period
equals to the consumer’s average data demand µ, which
is the consumer’s maximum average data consumption per
unit period, minus average unsatisfied data demand. In a t
period data plan, the total unsatisfied demand of a type-σ
consumer in a period of t is
∫ +∞
tq (x − tq)f(x|tµ,
√
tσ)dx,
then the average unsatisfied data demand per unit period is
1
t
∫ +∞
tq (x − tq)f(x|tµ,
√
tσ)dx. For example, if a consumer
with average data demand µ = 9GB and standard deviation
σ = 2 consume monthly data plan with a quota of 10GB,
3. Normal distribution is widely adopted in modeling consumers’
demand in different areas. For example, [21] applied normal distribu-
tion to model consumers’ connectivity of mobile network, while [22]
applied normal distribution to model consumers’ demand of electricity.
4. Mathematically, when we choose a large enough number of types,
the discrete-consumer-type model can well approximate a continuous-
consumer-type model. In reality, since consumers are heterogeneous, it
is more reasonable to assume that consumers’ types follow a continuous
distribution [23]. Hence, we will introduce the case of continuous
consumer type distribution in Section 4.
5. Intuitively, a consumer with a larger σ is with a higher data
fluctuation, and naturally needs a data plan with higher time flexibility.
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Fig. 2. A data demands example of consumers with different types-(µ,
σ).
and his demands of consecutive two months are 11GB
and 7GB, then his unsatisfied data demand of these two
months are (11 − 10)+ = 1GB and (7 − 10)+ = 0GB,
respectively. Since we assume the consumer’s demand per
unit period follows normal distribution with µ = 9 and
σ = 2, the average unsatisfied data demand equals to∫ +∞
−∞ (x − 10)+f(x|9, 2)dx =
∫ +∞
10 (x − 10)f(x|9, 2)dx =
0.5GB, which means his average total data consumption is
9GB − 0.5GB = 8.5GB. As shown in Figure 2, if all the
consumers choose the plan of period 1 and q = µ, only the
consumer with σ = 0 (the black dashed line) can reach an
average consumption of µ. On the contrary, the consumer
with σ = 4 (the red dashed line) can satisfy his demand in
the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 12th periods, but only consumes q in
the other periods due to the data cap.
From (1), we can find that
Vt(σ, t) =
ασ
2t1.5
∫ +∞
√
t∆q
σ
xf(x|0, 1)dx > 0
and
Vσ(σ, t) = − α√
t
∫ +∞
√
t∆q
σ
xf(x|0, 1)dx < 0,
which means that 1) without considering price, every con-
sumer prefers a larger period and 2) the consumer with
larger type has a smaller valuation. Furthermore, Vtt(σ, t)
is negative through direct calculation, meaning that V (σ, t)
grows more slowly in a larger period.
The utility of the consumer with type-σ who accepts the
data plan with period t is defined as the gap between his
valuation and payment of the data plan:
U(σ, t) = V (σ, t)− pi(t).
2.3 Contract Formulation
In this paper, we aim to design an optimal contract for the
SP to maximize its expected profit. The contract contains a
set of combinations, each of which includes a period t and
a corresponding unit period price pi(t). Each consumer can
only select one combination. Therefore, for each consumer
type σ ∈ Σ, the SP will assign a period t(σ) with unit period
price pi(t(σ)). The set of period-price combinations shown
above is a period-price contract. We denote the contract as
Cd = {
(
t(σ), pi(t(σ))
)| ∀σ ∈ Σ}.
TABLE 1
Notation
Symbol Meanings
q the average data cap per unit period
ti the time length of the ith data plan’s period
pii the unit period price of the ith data plan
{ti, pii} the data item with price tipiiand data quota tiq in a period of ti
C(ti)
the SP’s unit period expense of offering data plan
with period ti, i.e., the total expense of a data plan
of period ti is tiC(ti)
R(ti)
the unit period profit of the SP
from the data plan item {ti, pii}
µ consumers’ average data demand in a unit period
σi
In discrete-consumer-type model:
σi represents the standard deviation
of the unit period data demand of consumer i;
In continuous-consumer-type model:
σi represents the largest standard deviation
among the unit period data demand
of the consumers in the ith group
V (σ, t)
the valuation of a type-σ consumer
for the contract with period t
N the total number of consumers
Ni the number of consumers in group i
g(·) the probability density functionof the distribution of consumer type
G(·) the cumulative distribution functionof the distribution of consumer type
A feasible contract should satisfy the following two
constraints: 1) For any type-σ consumer, he prefers the
contract item with period t(σ) at the price pi(t(σ)) than any
other contract items; 2) The SP should guarantee that the
contract designed for any type-σ consumer leads to non-
negative utility so that the consumer is willing to accept the
contract designed for him. These two constraints are named
as incentive compatibility (IC) constraint and individual
rationality (IR) constraint correspondingly. Specifically, we
define,
Definition 1. IC constraint:
V (σ, t(σ))− pi(t(σ)) ≥ V (σ, t(σ′))− pi(t(σ′)), ∀σ′ 6= σ.
Definition 2. IR constraint:
V (σ, t(σ))− pi(t(σ)) ≥ 0, ∀σ ∈ Σ.
Any feasible contract satisfies IC and IR constraints, and
any contract satisfying IC and IR constraints is feasible.
The overall profit of the SP from a feasible contract Cd =
{t(σ), pi(t(σ))| ∀σ ∈ Σ} can be written as:
R =
∑
σ∈Σ
Nσ
(
pi(t(σ))− C(t(σ))), (2)
where Nσ is the number of consumers with type-σ.
3 CONTRACT FEASIBILITY AND OPTIMALITY
In this section, we first show the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the contract to be feasible. Then we derive
the best period assignments and price assignments for the
optimal contract that maximizes the SP’s overall profit,
which is defined in (2).
According to our assumption in Sec. 2.2, there is a finite
number of consumer types I . Without loss of generality,
5we let σ1 < σ2 < · · · < σI . Then, we rewrite the period
t(σi) assigned to the type-σi consumers as ti, and rewrite
the price pi(t(σi)) corresponding to the period t(σi) as pii
for simplicity. Accordingly, we can rewrite the SP’s profit
function R(t(σi)) and cost function as C(t(σi)) as R(ti)
and cost function as C(ti), respectively. For convenience,
we summarize the key notations in Table 1.
Therefore, the contract optimization problem can be
written as:
Problem 1.
max
{ti}
{pii}
I∑
i=1
Ni(pii − C(ti)),
s.t.
{
V (σi, ti)− pii ≥ V (σi, tj)− pij , ∀i, j∈I, j 6= i (IC)
V (σi, ti)− pii ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I (IR)
where I={1, 2, . . . , I}.
3.1 Feasibility
According to (1), we have the following property: for a given
period length increment, the consumers with larger type
will have a larger valuation increment than the consumers
with smaller type. We call this property as increasing pref-
erence (IP) property.6
Proposition 1 (IP property). For any consumer types σ > σ′
and any data plan periods t > t′, the following condition holds:
V (σ, t)− V (σ, t′) > V (σ′, t)− V (σ′, t′). (3)
Now, we try to find the necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the contract to be feasible, i.e., the necessary and
sufficient conditions of IC and IR constraints. We show the
first necessary condition in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. For any contract Cd = {(ti, pii)}, if it is feasible, then
the following condition holds:
σi > σj ⇒ ti ≥ tj .
Lemma 1 shows that the consumer with larger type σ
should be assigned a longer period.
We show the second necessary condition in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2. For any contract Cd = {(ti, pii)}, if it is feasible, then
the following condition holds:
ti > tj ⇔ pii > pij .
Lemma 2 shows that a longer period must be assigned
with a higher price. If there is a service with longer period
and a lower price, then everyone will select this data plan,
and the data plans with shorter periods are meaningless.
Together with the observations from Lemma 1, we can
find that the data plan with higher price will be assigned
to the consumer with larger consumer type (i.e., standard
deviation).
From the above two lemmas and IP property, we have
the following theorem, which shows the necessary and
sufficient conditions for a feasible contract.
6. Due to space limit, we put all of the detailed proofs in the online
technical report [32].
Theorem 1 (Necessary and Sufficient conditions for a feasi-
ble contract). For any contract Cd = {(ti, pii)}, its IC and IR
constraints are equivalent to the following conditions:
• 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tI . (4)
• piI ≤ V (σI , tI). (5)
• pii ≥ pii+1 + V (σi+1, ti)− V (σi+1, ti+1). (6)
• pii ≤ pii+1 + V (σi, ti)− V (σi, ti+1). (7)
The feasible regions of price assignments are then
pii ∈ [pii+1 + V (σi+1, ti)− V (σi+1, ti+1),
pii+1 + V (σi, ti)− V (σi, ti+1)].
From IP property, we have V (σi+1, ti) − V (σi+1, ti+1) <
V (σi, ti) − V (σi, ti+1). Therefore, the feasible regions of
price assignments are not empty.
Then, the IC and IR constraints in Problem 1 can be
substituted by the conditions shown in Theorem 1.
3.2 Optimality
To solve the contract optimization problem, we first solve
the optimal price assignments given the fixed period as-
signments, and then solve the optimal period assignments
by substituting the derived price assignments. From the
conditions in Theorem 1, we can get the following lemma,
which leads to the optimal price assignments.
Lemma 3. For any feasible contract Cd = {(ti, pii)} with fixed
periods t1 ≤ t2 ≤ . . . ≤ tI , the set of optimal price assignments
{p¯ii} that maximizes
∑I
i=1Ni(pii −C(ti)) under the conditions
in Theorem 1 is given by:
p¯iI = V (σI , tI). (8a)
p¯ii = p¯ii+1+V (σi, ti)−V (σi, ti+1),∀i ∈ {1, . . . , I−1}.
(8b)
Proof. We can observe that the price assignments in Lemma
3 satisfy the conditions in Theorem 1.
Since the period assignments are fixed, the total cost of
the SP
∑I
i=1NiC(ti) is fixed. Therefore, if there is another
set of price assignments {pˆii} that leads to a larger profit
(i.e.,
∑I
i=1Nipˆii >
∑I
i=1Nip¯ii), then there is at least one
price pˆij > p¯ij . According to Theorem 1, to guarantee the
feasibility of the contract, the following constraint on {pˆii}
must be satisfied:
pˆij+1 + V (σj , tj)− V (σj , tj+1) ≥ pˆij . (9)
From (8) we have
pˆij > p¯ij = p¯ij+1 + V (σj , tj)− V (σj , tj+1). (10)
By substituting (10) into (9), we have pˆij+1 > p¯ij+1, which
implies pˆij+2 > p¯ij+2 ⇒ . . . ⇒ pˆiI > p¯iI . Since V (σI , tI) =
p¯iI < pˆiI , the IR condition is violated. Therefore, there does
not exist any set of feasible price assignments {pˆii} with a
larger profit than {p¯ii}.
From Lemma 3, we can find that for fixed period assign-
ments, the optimal price assignments are:
p¯ii=V (σI , tI)+
I−1∑
n=i
(
V (σn, tn)−V (σn, tn+1)
)
,∀i ∈ I. (11)
6The maximum overall profit is obtained by solving the
following optimization problem
max
{ti}
R¯({ti}), s.t. 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tI , (12)
where R¯({ti}) is the overall profit of the optimal contract
with fixed period assignments {ti}. By subsituting the de-
rived optimal price assignments (11) into (2), we have:
R¯({ti})=
I∑
i=1
Ni
(
p¯ii − C(ti)
)
=
I∑
i=1
(
NiV (σi, ti)−NiC(ti) +Ai
i−1∑
n=1
Nn
)
, (13)
where Ai = V (σi, ti)− V (σi−1, ti) and A1 = 0.
We define Pi asNiV (σi, ti)−NiC(ti)+Ai
∑i−1
n=1Nn and
find that Pi is only based on the period ti, which is designed
for type σi consumers. Therefore, the contract optimization
problem can be divided into the following I optimization
problems.
max
ti
Pi,∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . I}. (14)
We use tˆi to indicate the period that maximizes Pi, i.e., tˆi =
arg maxti Pi. Since Pi is concave for all i
7, the optimal tˆi is
either of the boundary points or the critical point (the point
satisfying ∂Pi/∂ti = 0 and ∂2Pi/∂ti2 ≤ 0).
We can show that if the period assignments {tˆk} are
in increasing order, then they are the optimal solution of
problem (12). However, it is possible that {tˆi} are not in
increasing order, which means that they may not be feasible.
Each set of infeasible period assignments must have at
least one infeasible sub-sequence, which is defined in the
following definition:
Definition 3. A sub-sequence {ti, ti+1, . . . , tj} is an infeasible
sub-sequence if it satisfies the following two conditions:
• ti ≥ ti+1 ≥ . . . ≥ tj ,
• ti > tj .
Next, we design a mechanism to replace each infeasible
sub-sequence by a feasible sub-sequence. We apply the
following proposition to design the mechanism.
Proposition 2. There are K concave functions Yk(yk) and yˆk =
arg maxyk Yk(yk). If yˆ1 ≥ yˆ2 ≥ . . . ≥ yˆK , then the optimal
solution
{y¯k} = arg max{yk}
K∑
k=1
Yk(yk), s.t. y1 ≤ y2 ≤ . . . ≤ yK (15)
satisfies y¯1 = y¯2 = . . . = y¯K .
The proposition is proved in [25].
Based on Proposition 2, we can see that Algorithm 1,
which is an iterative algorithm, can be used to adjust infea-
sible sub-sequences in {tˆi} into feasible sub-sequences. The
details of Algorithm 1 are shown as follows.
7. It is because both ∂2Ai/∂t2i and Vtiti (σi, ti)− Ctiti (ti) are nega-
tive.
Algorithm 1 Iterative Algorithm to deal with infeasible sub-
sequences
1: Initialization t¯i = tˆi for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , I}.
2: repeat
3: Find an infeasible sub-sequence {t¯m, t¯m+1, . . . , t¯n}.
4: Let t¯i = arg maxt
∑n
k=m Pk(t), for all k ∈ {m,m +
1, · · · , n}.
5: until {t¯i} are feasible.
4 CONTINUOUS-CONSUMER-TYPE WITH GROUP
DIVISION
In general, since consumers are mutually independent, the
probability that each two consumers have the same standard
deviation (i.e., σ) approaches to zero. Therefore, it is more
realistic to assume that the consumer types follow a con-
tinuous distribution. Under such an assumption, to design
a contract item for each consumer type is equivalent to
providing infinite contract items, which is not realistic and
not consumer friendly. Thus, we propose a novel contract
design mechanism for continuous-consumer-type model.
The mechanism divides the consumers into limited number
of groups according to their types and give a contract
item for each group. Specifically, in this mechanism, we
optimize the group boundaries as well as the period and
price assignments in order to maximize the SP’s overall
profit.
4.1 Contract Formulation
We assume that the SP divides the consumers into K
groups. Instead of designing a distinct contract item for each
consumer type, the SP offers a single contract item for each
group of consumer types. We denote the set of group indices
as K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}, where the minimum consumer type
in the kth (k ∈ K) group is denoted as σ[min]k and the maxi-
mum consumer type in the kth group is denoted as σ[max]k .
We assume that the consumer type σ follows a continuous
distribution and the probability density function is g(σ). We
use σmin (where σmin ≥ 0) and σmax (where σmax ≥ σmin)
to denote the minimum and maximum value of the feasible
interval, i.e., g(σ) > 0 only when σ ∈ [σmin, σmax].8
Without loss of generality, we assume σmin ≤ σ[min]1 ≤
σ
[max]
1 ≤ σ[min]2 ≤ σ[max]2 ≤ . . . ≤ σ[min]K ≤ σ[max]K ≤ σmax.
Since the consumer types follow a continuous distribution,
we have σ[max]k−1 = σ
[min]
k for all k ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,K}. The set of
variables {σ[max]k | ∀k ∈ K} is named as group boundaries.
In this paper, we let σ[min]1 = σmin for simplicity. We use
N to denote the total number of consumers, and denote the
number of consumers in the kth group as Nk, where
Nk=N
∫ σ[max]k
σ
[max]
k−1
g(x)dx = N
(
G(σ
[max]
k )−G(σ[max]k−1 )
)
. (16)
8. To better illustrate the insights, we assume that g(σ) > 0 for all
σ ∈ [σmin, σmax] in this paper. For the case that g(σ) = 0 for some σ
in the feasible interval, we can also show that our following analysis is
valid.
7In (16), G(σ) is the cumulative distribution function of
consumer type σ, and
G(σ
[max]
k ) =
∑k
s=1Ns
N
.
In other words, NG(σ) denotes the number of consumers
with type less than or equal to σ.
Similar to our discussion on the contract for discrete-
consumer-type model in Sec. 2 and 3, for each consumer
group k ∈ K, the SP will assign a combination including a
period tk and a unit period price pik. We denote the contract
for continuous-consumer-type model as Cc = {(tk, pik)}.
The expected profit of the SP can be written as:
R =
∑
k∈K
Nk(pik − C(tk)) (17)
=
∑
k∈K
N
(
G(σ
[max]
k )−G(σ[max]k−1 )
)
(pik − C(tk)).
To guarantee the feasibility of the contract, it should
satisfy the IC and IR constraints: 1) For any consumer in
group k, he prefers the contract item that with period tk at
the price pik than any other contract items; 2) The SP should
guarantee that the contract item designed for any consumer
group leads to non-negative utility for each consumer in
this group so that the consumers are willing to accept the
contract designed for them. Specifically, we define,
Definition 4. IC constraint:
V (σ, tk)−pik≥V (σ, tk′)−pik′ , ∀σ ∈ [σ[max]k−1 , σ[max]k ], k′ 6= k.
Definition 5. IR constraint:
V (σ, tk)− pik ≥ 0, ∀σ ∈ [σ[max]k−1 , σ[max]k ].
Then, the SP’s profit maximization problem becomes finding
the optimal group boundaries, period assignments and price
assignments, i.e.,
{σ[max]k , (tk, pik)} = arg max{σ[max]k }{tk}{pik}
R (18)
subject to the IC and IR constraints in Definition 4, 5 and the
following boundary condition:
σmin ≤ σ[max]1 ≤ σ[max]2 ≤ · · · ≤ σ[max]K ≤ σmax. (19)
First, we can find that IP property in Proposition 1 is still
satisfied in continuous-consumer-type model. Then, we try
to find the necessary and sufficient conditions for the IC and
IR constraints. We show the first necessary condition in the
following corollary.
Corollary 1. For any contract Cc = {(tk, pik)| ∀k ∈ K}, if it is
feasible, then the following condition holds:
k > k′ ⇒ tk ≥ tk′ .
Corollary 1 is directly obtained from Lemma 1. Hence, the
proof of the corollary is structurally the same as Lemma 1
and is omitted.
The second necessary condition is shown in Lemma 2,
which shows that a longer period must be assigned with a
higher price.
From Lemma 2, Corollary 1 and IP property, we have
the following theorem, which shows the necessary and
sufficient conditions of the IC and IR constraints for the
contract for continuous-consumer-type model with group
division.
Theorem 2. For any contract Cc = {(tk, pik)}, its IC and IR
constraints are equivalent to the following conditions:
• 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tK . (20)
• piK ≤ V (σ[max]K , tK). (21)
• pik = pik+1 + V (σ[max]k , tk)− V (σ[max]k , tk+1). (22)
The contract optimization problem is then to maximize
the SP’s overall profit R under Theorem 2 and boundary
condition (19). In this problem, the variables needed to be
optimized are: 1) the period and price of each contract item,
i.e., tk and pik; 2) the boundary of each group, i.e., σ
[max]
k .
4.2 Contract Optimization
According to Theorem 2, we can obtain the optimal price
assignments as follows:
p¯iK =V (σ
[max]
K , tK),
p¯ik = p¯ik+1+V (σ
[max]
k , tk)−V (σ[max]k , tk+1) ∀k 6= K,
which implies
p¯ik = V (σ
[max]
K , tK)+
K−1∑
s=k
(
V (σ[max]s , ts)−V (σ[max]s , ts+1)
)
.
(23)
By substituting (23) into (17), the overall profit of the SP can
be rewritten as follows
R =
K∑
k=1
Nk(p¯ik − C(tk)) (24a)
=
K∑
k=1
Nk
(
V (σ
[max]
K , tK)−C(tk)
+
K−1∑
s=k
(
V (σ[max]s , ts)− V (σ[max]s , ts+1)
))
(24b)
=
K∑
k=1
(
NkV (σ
[max]
k , tk)−NkC(tk)+Ak
k−1∑
s=1
Ns
)
(24c)
=
K−1∑
k=1
NG(σ
[max]
k )
(
V (σ
[max]
k , tk)− V (σ[max]k , tk+1)
)
+
K−1∑
k=1
NG(σ
[max]
k )
(
C(tk+1)− C(tk)
)
+NG(σ
[max]
K )
(
V (σ
[max]
K , tK)− C(tK)
)
, (24d)
where Ak = V (σ
[max]
k , tk)− V (σ[max]k−1 , tk) and A1 = 0.
4.2.1 Introduction of The Alternative Maximizing Algorithm
Finding the optimal period assignments {tk} and group
boundaries {σ[max]k } that can maximize the SP’s overall
profit with price assignments in (23) is very challenging
because problem (18) is NP-hard [15]. Therefore, we intro-
duce an alternative maximizing algorithm to find a sub-
optimal solution. In this algorithm, we divide the variables
into two groups, where the first group contains all the
8∂Qk(σk)
∂σk
= Ng(σk)
(
V (σk, tk)− V (σk, tk+1) +
G(σk)
(
Vσk(σk, tk)− Vσk(σk, tk+1)
)
g(σk)
+ C(tk+1)−C(tk)
)
. (32)
Hk(σk)
σk
=
∫ tk+1
tk
αe
− t∆q2
2σ2
k (t∆q2 + σ2k)
2
√
2pitσ2kg(σk)t
( t∆q2(σ2k − t∆q2)
σ3k(σ
2
k + t∆q
2)
G(σk)− 2g
2(σk)− gσk(σk)G(σk)
g(σk)
)
dt. (36)
period assignments {tk}, and the other group contains all
the group boundaries {σ[max]k }. At the beginning of the
algorithm, we divide the consumers into K groups by
randomly generating K group boundaries {σ[max]k } such
that σmin < σ
[max]
1 < σ
[max]
2 < · · · < σ[max]K < σmax.
Then, we iterate the following two steps. In the first step,
we keep the group boundaries {σ[max]k } unchanged and
maximize the overall profit R by tuning period assignments
{tk}. In the second step, we keep period assignments {tk}
(which are obtained by solving the problem in the previous
step) unchanged and update group boundaries {σ[max]k } to
maximize R. For the rest of the paper, we will simply use
σk to denote σ
[max]
k which is the threshold between group k
and group k + 1.
The details of these two steps are as follows.
• Step I: In this step, we find the optimal period
assignments that can maximize the overall profit R
with fixed group boundaries {σk}. Specifically, we
have the following problem
max
{ti}
R, s.t. 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ · · · ≤ tK . (25)
We can show that the overall profit in (24c) is struc-
turally similar to the overall profit (13) in Sec. 3.
Therefore, this optimization problem can be solved
through the same method that solves problem (12).
For writing convenience, we define
Pk = NkV (σk, tk)−NkC(tk) +Ak
k−1∑
s=1
Ns, (26)
where Ak = V (σk, tk) − V (σk−1, tk) and A1 = 0.
Then, we divide the problem (25) into K optimiza-
tion problems
max
tk
Pk, ∀k ∈ K. (27)
Since Pk is concave for all k, the period assignment
tˆk that can maximize Pk is at the boundary points or
at the critical point, i.e.,
tˆk =
{
0 if t˜k < 0,
t˜k if t˜k ≥ 0, (28)
where t˜k is the solution of ∂Pk/∂tk = 0.
By denoting the optimal solution of problem (25) as
{t¯k}, we can see that if the period assignments {tˆk}
from (27) are in increasing order, then t¯k = tˆk for all
k. However, if {tˆk} are not in increasing order, which
means that they may not be feasible, we need to use
Algorithm 1 to adjust infeasible period assignments
to make them feasible. In the input of the algorithm,
we define Pk as in (26) and let I = K .
• Step II: In this step, we find the optimal group
boundaries that can maximize the overall profit R
with fixed period assignments {tk}. Specifically, we
have the following optimization problem:
max
{σk}
R, s.t. σmin ≤ σ1 ≤ · · · ≤ σK ≤ σmax. (29)
By defining Qk(σk) as
Qk(σk)=NG(σk)
(
V (σk, tk)−V (σk, tk+1)
+C(tk+1)−C(tk)
)
, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K−1},
(30a)
QK(σK)=NG(σK)
(
V (σK , tK)−C(tK)
)
, (30b)
we can find that the overall revenue R in (24d)
can be represented as the summation of Qk(σk).
(30) implies that Qk(σk) is only related to σk, i.e.,
the group boundary between group k and group
k + 1, and independent of the other group bound-
aries {σs| ∀s ∈ K, s 6= k}. Therefore, the best
group boundaries for (29), denoted by {σ¯k}, can be
computed by separately maximizing each of Qk(σk),
∀k ∈ K.
We use σˆk to denote the group boundary that maxi-
mizes Qk(σk), i.e.,
σˆk = arg maxσk
Qk(σk),∀k ∈ K. (31)
If the group boundaries {σˆk} obtained by solving
(31) are in increasing order, {σˆk} are exactly the
solution of (29), i.e., σ¯k = σˆk ∀k ∈ K. If {σˆk} are not
in increasing order, some further steps are needed
to obtain the optimal group boundaries of (29) from
{σˆk}.
In order to solve the problem (31), we find the first
order derivative of Qk(σk) with respect to σk, which
is shown in (32) on the top of this page. Although the
form of ∂Qk(σk)/∂σk is complicated, we obtain the
unimodality of Qk(σk) in the following Theorem.
Theorem 3. If the distribution of the consumer types σ
satisfies the condition
2g2(σ)− gσ(σ)G(σ)
g(σ)
≥
{
0 if σ = 0,
3−2√2
σ G(σ) if σ > 0,
(33)
then with the fixed period assignments, the formula
Qk(σk) is unimodal with respect to σk for all k ∈ K.
9Proof. By defining Hk(σk) as
Hk(σk)=V (σk, tk)− V (σk, tk+1)
+
G(σk)
(
Vσk(σk, tk)− Vσk(σk, tk+1)
)
g(σk)
=
∫ tk
tk+1
Vt(σk, t)+
G(σk)
g(σk)
Vσk,t(σk, t)dt, (34)
the first order derivation of Qk(σk) with respect to
σk can be rewritten as:
∂Qk(σk)
∂σk
= Ng(σk)(Hk(σk) + C(tk+1)− C(tk)).
(35)
Since g(σk) is positive and C(tk+1) − C(tk) is a
constant for fixed period assignments, Qk(σk) is
unimodal if Hk(σk) is monotonic with respect to σk.
To study the monotonicity of Hk(σk), we need to
find the first order derivative of it with respect to σk,
which is shown in (36) on the top of this page. Before
we find the sign of the first order derivation, we first
show the following lemma.
Lemma 4. For any t ≥ 0 and σ > 0, we have
t∆q2(σ2 − t∆q2)
σ3(σ2 + t∆q2)
≤ 3− 2
√
2
σ
. (37)
We can show that t∆q
2(σ2−t∆q2)
σ3(σ2+t∆q2) G(σ) = 0 when
σ = 0, and t∆q
2(σ2−t∆q2)
σ3(σ2+t∆q2) G(σ) ≤ 3−2
√
2
σ G(σ) when
σ > 0. Hence, if the distribution of the consumer
type satisfies (33) in Theorem 3 for all σ ≥ 0, then
∂Hk(σk)/∂σk is always non-positive and Hk(σk)
crosses zero at most once. Therefore, Qk(σk) is uni-
modal with respect to σk.
In next subsection, we will show that (33) applies
for some typical distributions. Then, according to
Theorem 3, Qk(σk) is an unimodal function with
respect to σk. Therefore, the optimal σˆk is at the
boundary point or the critical point, i.e.,
σˆk =
{
0 if σ˜k < 0,
σ˜k if σ˜k ≥ 0, (38)
where σ˜k is the solution of ∂Qk(σk)/∂σk = 0.
The group boundaries {σˆk}, which are obtained by
separately maximizing each ofQk(σk), may not be in
increasing order, which means they may not be fea-
sible. Each set of infeasible group boundaries must
have at least one infeasible sub-sequence, which is
defined in Definition 3. In order to adjust an in-
feasible sequence {σˆi, σˆi+1, · · · σˆj} to a feasible sub-
sequence, we first show a property of Qk(σk) in the
following proposition.
Proposition 3. For any i, j ∈ K and j ≥ i, the function∑j
k=iQk(σ) is a unimodal function with respect to σ.
Then we apply the following proposition to design a
mechanism to deal with the infeasible sub-sequence
in {σk}.
Algorithm 2 Alternative Maximizing Algorithm
1: Initialize K arbitrary groups?boundaries {σk}, where
σk ≥ 0 ∀k and σmin < σ1 < σ2 < · · · < σK < σmax.
2: repeat
3: Step I:
4: for all k ∈ K do
5: Define Pk asNkV (σ
[max]
k , tk)−NkC(tk)+Ak
∑k−1
s=1Ns.
6: Solve the problem: maxtk Pk, where the optimal
point tˆk can be obtained from (28).
7: end for
8: If the period assignments obtained are not feasible,
using Algorithm 1 to adjust infeasible sub-sequences
into feasible sub-sequences (the definition of infeasi-
ble sub-sequence is in Definition 3).
9: Step II:
10: for all k ∈ K do
11: Calculate Qk(σk) according to (30).
12: Solve the problem: maxσk Qk(σk), where the opti-
mal point σˆk can be obtained from (38).
13: end for
14: Initialization σ¯k = σˆk for all k ∈ K.
15: repeat
16: Find an infeasible sub-sequence {σ¯i, σ¯i+1, · · · , σ¯j}.
17: Let σ¯k = arg maxσ
∑j
k=iQk(σk), for all k ∈ {i, i +
1, · · · , j}.
18: until {σ¯k} are feasible.
19: until Convergence.
Proposition 4. There are 2 unimodal functions Q1(σ1)
and Q2(σ2). If σˆ1 ≥ σˆ2, where σˆ1 = arg maxσ1Q1(σ1)
and σˆ2 = arg maxσ2 Q2(x2), then the optimal solution
{σ¯k} = arg max{σk}
2∑
k=1
Qk(σk), s.t. σ1 ≤ σ2
satisfies σ¯1 = σ¯2.
Since the unimodal functions {Qk(σk)} have the
property shown in Proposition 3, Proposition 4
can be extended to a more general form: for any
j ≥ i, if σˆi ≥ σˆi+1 ≥ · · · ≥ σˆj , where σˆk =
arg maxσk Qk(σk), then the optimal solution {σ¯k} =
arg maxσk
∑j
k=iQk(σk) subject to σi ≤ σi+1 ≤ · · · ≤
σj satisfies σ¯i = σ¯i+1 = · · · = σ¯j .
By means of Proposition 4, we can use an algorithm
similar to Algorithm 1, to adjust infeasible sub-
sequences in {σk} to feasible sub-sequences.
The details of the alternative maximizing algorithm are
illustrated in Algorithm 2.
4.2.2 Convergence of The Alternative Maximizing Algo-
rithm
In the alternative maximizing algorithm, with arbitrary
initialized group boundaries, we alternatively update the
period assignments {tk} and group boundaries {σk} in
order to maximize the overall profit R.
In each step of the alternative maximizing algorithm, we
try to adjust the period assignments or group boundaries
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to maximize R. Hence, the value of R is monotonically
increasing. Since the value of overall profit R is upper
bounded, the algorithm will finally converge.
4.3 Analysis of Some Typical Distributions of The Con-
sumer Types
In this subsection, we will show that (33) in Theorem 3
applies for some typical distributions of consumer types, in-
cluding uniform distribution, exponential distribution and
truncated normal distribution.
4.3.1 Uniform Distribution
We first study the case that the consumer types follow a
uniform distribution. Specifically, we have
g(σ) =
1
σmax − σmin , (39)
gσ(σ) = 0, (40)
G(σ) =
σ − σmin
σmax − σmin . (41)
By substituting (39), (40) and (41) into 2g
2(σ)−gσ(σ)G(σ)
g(σ)G(σ) (i.e.,
the left hand of (33)), we have
2g2(σ)− gσ(σ)G(σ)
g(σ)G(σ)
=
2g(σ)
G(σ)
=
2
σ − σmin =
2
σ
σ
σ − σmin
(a)
≥ 2
σ
≥ 3− 2
√
2
σ
,
where (a) is from the fact that σσ−σmin ≥ 1 for all
σ ∈ [σmin, σmax]. In conclusion, (33) holds for the case of
uniform distribution in consumer types.
4.3.2 Exponential Distribution
Next, we study the case that the consumer types follow an
exponential distribution. Specifically, we have
g(σ) = λe−λσ, (42)
gσ(σ) = −λ2e−λσ, (43)
G(σ) = 1− e−λσ. (44)
Here, λ > 0 is the rate parameter of the exponential distribu-
tion. By substituting (42), (43) and (44) into 2g
2(σ)−gσ(σ)G(σ)
g(σ) ,
we have
2g2(σ)− gσ(σ)G(σ)
g(σ)
= λ(1 + e−λσ).
When σ = 0, we have λ(1 + e−λσ) = 2λ > 0, which
satisfies (33) in Theorem 3.
When σ > 0, we have
2g2(σ)− gσ(σ)G(σ)
g(σ)
= λ(1 + e−λσ)
=
λσ
1− e−λσ
1 + e−λσ
σ
(1− e−λσ)
=
x
1− e−x
1 + e−λσ
σ
(1− e−λσ),
(45)
where x = λσ and x > 0. Before finding the lower bound of
(45), we first derive the following proposition.
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Fig. 3. Examples of F (σ) with different truncated normal distributions.
Proposition 5. For x > 0, the formula x1−e−x is lower bounded
by 1.
According to Proposition 5, we have
2g2(σ)− gσ(σ)
g(σ)G(σ)
=
x
1− e−x
1 + e−λσ
σ
(1− e−λσ)
≥ 1 + e
−λσ
σ
(1− e−λσ)
(b)
≥ 3− 2
√
2
σ
G(σ), (46)
where (b) is from the fact 1+e−λσ > 1 for any σ > 0. In con-
clusion, (33) holds for the case of exponential distribution in
consumer types.
4.3.3 Truncated Normal Distribution
In truncated normal distribution, we can not obtain the
expression of the cumulative function G(σ) in closed-form
due to the non-integrability of the formula. Hence, we are
not able to show (33) analytically. In this case, we use
numerical results to illustrate that (33) holds for various
parameters.
When σ = 0, we have 2g
2(σ)−gσ(σ)G(σ)
g(σ) = 2g(σ) ≥ 0,
which means that (33) holds for the case σ = 0.
When σ > 0, to simplify the notations, we define a
function F (σ) as
F (σ) =
2g2(σ)− gσ(σ)G(σ)
g(σ)
− 3− 2
√
2
σ
G(σ).
If we can show that F (σ) ≥ 0 for various parameters, which
means 2g
2(σ)−gσ(σ)G(σ)
g(σ) ≥ 3−2
√
2
σ G(σ), then we can see that
(33) holds for truncated normal distribution with various
parameters.
In our simulation settings, we let the minimum value
of truncated normal distribution a = 0 and the maximum
value of truncated normal distribution b = 6. We use M
and W to denote the mean and the standard deviation of
the corresponding normal distribution. As shown in Figure
3, the value of F (σ) is positive for different combinations of
M andW values. Therefore, (33) holds for truncated normal
distribution with various parameters.
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5 SIMULATION RESULTS
In the simulation, we first implement the proposed
period-price contract in discrete-consumer-type model, and
then implement the proposed period-price contract in
continuous-consumer-type model. Without loss of general-
ity, we set the predefined parameter α = 1 and the average
data demand per unit period as µ = 13. We assume the
data cap of the unit period data plan is q = 15 and the cost
function of the SP is C(t) = 0.5t+ 10 9.
5.1 Discrete-Consumer-Type
In discrete-consumer-type model, we assume the number
of consumer types I = 11. The set of consumer types is
Σ = {0.1, 0.7, 1.3, · · · , 6.1}.
9. According to [26], [27], [28], a consumer usually chooses a data
plan with monthly data cap larger than his average consumption.
Period of data plan helps an SP to manage its network capacity, because
an SP should make sure a corresponding network capacity is prepared
during the whole period in case that the consumers consume all data
quota for the whole period in a very short time. Hence, a larger period
requires the SP to prepare more network capacity and will lead to a
higher cost. Here for simplicity, we consider a linear-form cost, which
has been widely used to model an operator’s operational cost (e.g., [29],
[30]).
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Fig. 6. Comparison between optimal contract and social surplus maxi-
mization scheme.
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Fig. 7. Comparison between optimal contract and the monthly-period
scheme.
We run the simulation of the optimal contract in two
cases. In Case (1), the numbers of consumers in each type
are identical. In Case (2), the numbers are distributed in a
mountain shape, which means the probability of medium is
large.
We define the social surplus generated by the contract
with period ti, denoted by S(σi, ti), as the aggregate utilities
of SP and the consumer with type σi, i.e.,
S(σi, t) , V (σi, ti)− C(ti).
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the period and price assign-
ments in the optimal contract. The blue curve in Figure
4 presents the social optimal period assignments, which
maximize the social surplus. Specifically, we have ti =
arg maxt S(σi, t). From Figure 4, we can see that the social
optimal period assignments are always smaller than that in
the optimal contract. This is because the optimal contract
is aimed to maximize the SP’s overall profit rather than the
social surplus. The SP prefers to increase the period assigned
to the higher type consumers in order to increase the interest
of the lower type consumers in the short period contract
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Fig. 9. Price assignments in continuous-consumer-type model.
items. Hence, by increasing the price of the short period
contract items, the SP can increase the profit.
Figure 6 shows the social surplus in the optimal contract
and social optimal assignments. The bars So denote the
social surplus in the social optimal period assignments
while the social surplus of our proposed optimal contract
is represented by the bars Sc. We can see that So is larger
than Sc in both Case (1) and Case (2), since the optimal
contract is aimed to maximize the SP’s profit rather than
social surplus. However, our proposed optimal contract can
achieve around 93% of the maximum social surplus.
The comparison between our proposed optimal contract
and conventional monthly-period scheme in terms of SP’s
profit is shown in Figure 7. The bars Ru and Rc denote
the profits of the SP in the monthly-period scheme and our
optimal contract, respectively. We can see that our optimal
contract can increase the SP’s profit by 41% and 37% for Case
(1) and Case (2) correspondingly. This is because the optimal
contract increases the period assigned to the consumers with
larger consumer types in order to increase the interest of the
smaller type consumers in the short period contract items.
Hence, by increasing the price of the long period contract
items and decreasing the period of the short period items,
the SP can increase its profit.
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Fig. 10. Comparison among the original data plan with 1-month period,
current rollover data plan with 2-month period and optimal contract
in continuous-consumer-type model with different distributions of con-
sumer types.
5.2 Continuous-Consumer-Type
Next, we implement the proposed contract for continuous-
consumer-type model. Figure 8 and Figure 9 show the
period and price assignments in the contract with different
numbers of contract items. The x-axis represents the group
boundaries. In these two figures, the distribution of con-
sumer types (i.e., g(σ)) follows uniform distribution with
σmin = 0 and σmax = 6.
From the figures we can find that as the number of
group increases, more consumers are under served. From
IP Property in Proposition 1, with a given period length
increment, the consumers with larger consumer type have a
larger valuation increment than the consumers with smaller
types. Therefore, with more groups, the SP can serve con-
sumers with a wider range, increase the price of contract
item designed for consumers with large types and decrease
the cost of serving the consumers with small types by
increasing period assigned to consumers with large types
and decreasing the period assigned to consumers with small
types. In all these ways, the SP can increase its overall profit.
Figure 10 represents the comparison between our pro-
posed contracts with different group numbers and two
state-of-art data plans in terms of SP’s profit. They are the
original one-month data plan and the rollover data plan
provided by AT&T. The rollover scheme can be seen as a
contract with period of two months. We run the simula-
tion under the cases of 1) uniformly distributed consumer
types, 2) exponentially distributed consumer types and 3)
truncated normally distributed consumer types. Compar-
ing with the original data plan with 1-month period, our
contract with 6 groups can increase the SP’s profit by 37%,
92% and 43% in case 1), case 2) and case 3), respectively.
Besides, comparing with the rollover data plan with 2-
month period, our contract with 6 groups can increase the
SP’s profit by 21%, 61% and 26% in case 1), case 2) and case
3), respectively. From the figure we can find that the SP’s
profit is increasing with the number of groups. Specifically,
by increasing the number of groups from 1 to 6, the SP
can increase its profit by 12%, 12% and 8% in case 1), case
2) and case 3), respectively; by increasing the number of
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groups from 2 to 6, the SP can increase its profit by by 3.6%,
4.9% and 3.2% in case 1), case 2) and case 3), respectively.
Therefore, the SP needs to optimize the number of contract
items instead of just offering one or two contract items.
Moreover, the increment from 4 groups to 6 groups is very
small, i.e., the profit of the SP achieved by the contract with
4 groups can reach over 98% of that by the contract with 6
groups. Since more groups will lead to more operation costs
and is not consumer friendly, we can conclude that 4 groups
is a suitable choice of group numbers, and it is in line with
the number of contract items in real life [31].
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce the design of data plans with
different lengths of period, in order to provide more time
flexibility to consumers and increase the SP’s profit. We
design a contract that contains a set of period-price com-
binations for each of the discrete-consumer-type model
and the continuous-consumer-type model. In the discrete-
consumer-type model, each combination is intended for a
consumer type, while in continuous-consumer-type model,
each combination is intended for a range of consumer types.
We design the IC and IR constraints of the contracts, under
which the consumer will select the contract item designed
for him rather than the others. We find the sufficient and
necessary conditions of the feasible contract and design an
optimal (sub-optimal) contract for the SP to maximize its
overall profit in each model. In the future, we will extend
this work for two perspectives. The first one is the user
mobility. We will consider a city-wise SP, who can deploy
service in several cities, then the SP’s price differentiation
problem in different cities needs to be considered based on
user mobilities. The second one is the multi-dimensional
data plan setting. For example, the SP can offer a two-
dimensional contract, which includes both the length of the
data period and the volume of the data cap.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
First, we have
Vσt(σ, t) =
α
2t1.5
∫ +∞
√
t∆q
σ
xf(x|0, 1)dx+ α∆q
2
2
√
tσ2
f(
√
t∆q
σ
|0, 1)
> 0.
Since σ > σ′ and t > t′, we can rewrite (3) as:
V (σ, t)− V (σ, t′)−
(
V (σ′, t)− V (σ′, t′)
)
=
∫ t
t′
Vt(σ, x)dx−
∫ t
t′
Vt(σ
′, x)dx
=
∫ t
t′
( ∫ σ
σ′
Vσt(y, x)dy
)
dx > 0.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We prove the lemma by contradiction. If σi > σj and tj > ti
hold at the same time, then from the IP property we have:
V (σi, tj)− V (σi, ti) > V (σj , tj)− V (σj , ti)
⇒V (σi, tj) + V (σj , ti) > V (σi, ti) + V (σj , tj),
which violates the IC constraint:
V (σi, ti)− pii ≥ V (σi, tj)− pij
V (σj , tj)− pij ≥ V (σj , ti)− pii
}
⇒
V (σi, ti) + V (σj , tj) ≥ V (σi, tj) + V (σj , ti).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
Proof. We prove the right direction first and then the left:
1) From the IC constraint, if ti > tj , we have:
V (σj , tj)− pij ≥ V (σj , ti)− pii
⇒V (σj , tj)− V (σj , ti) ≥ pij − pii.
Since Vt(σ, t) > 0 and ti > tj , we can find:
V (σj , tj)− V (σj , ti) < 0⇒ pij − pii < 0.
2) From the IC constraint, we have:
V (σi, ti)− pii ≥ V (σi, tj)− pij
⇒V (σi, ti)− V (σi, tj) ≥ pii − pij .
If pii > pij , then
V (σi, ti) > V (σi, tj).
Since Vt(σ, t) > 0 and V (σi, ti) > V (σi, tj), we can
find ti > tj .
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
We first prove the sufficiency of the conditions in Theorem
1 and then the necessity of them.
1) Sufficiency.
We can use mathematical induction to prove the suf-
ficiency of the conditions. We use Cd(i) to denote the
subset of contract Cd containing the last i contract
items, i.e., Cd(i) = {(σj , tj)|j = I − i+ 1, . . . , I}.
We first prove Cd(i) is feasible. Since there is only
one consumer type σI in this contract, we only need
to justify the IR constraint, which can be proved
directly from the condition (5) in Theorem 1.
Then, we prove if Cd(i) is feasible, Cd(i+ 1) is also
feasible. We have the following conditions if Cd(i)
is feasible.
V(σI−i+1,tI−i+1)−piI−i+1≥V (σI−i+1,tm)−pim,∀m ∈Ii10,
(47)
V(σm,tm)−pim≥V(σm,tI−i+1)−piI−i+1,∀m ∈Ii,
(48)
V (σm, tm)− pim ≥ 0, ∀m ∈ Ii. (49)
From the conditions (6) and (7) of Theorem 1, we
have:
piI−i≥piI−i+1+V(σI−i+1,tI−i)−V(σI−i+1,tI−i+1),
(50)
piI−i≤piI−i+1+V (σI−i, tI−i)−V (σI−i, tI−i+1). (51)
With the above conditions and the IP property, we
are going to prove that the IC and IR constraints for
the contract Cd(i+ 1) are satisfied.
IC constraints:
V(σI−i,tI−i)−piI−i≥V(σI−i,tm)−pim,∀m ∈Ii,
(52)
V(σm,tm)−pim≥V(σm,tI−i)−piI−i,∀m ∈Ii, (53)
IR constraint:
V(σI−i,tI−i)−piI−i ≥ 0. (54)
If the above constrains are satisfied, Cd(i + 1) is
feasible.
By adding up (47) and (51), we have:
V(σI−i, tI−i)−piI−i≥V(σI−i, tI−i+1)+V(σI−i+1, tm)
− V (σI−i+1, tI−i+1)−pim,
for all m∈Ii. From the IP property, we have:
V (σI−i+1, tm)− V (σI−i+1, tI−i+1)
≥V (σI−i, tm)− V (σI−i, tI−i+1),
for all m ∈ Ii, since σI−i+1 > σI−i and tm ≥
tI−i+1. By adding up the above two equations, (52)
is proved.
By adding up (48) and (50), we have:
V(σm, tm)− pim ≥V(σm, tI−i+1)+V(σI−i+1, tI−i)
− V (σI−i+1, tI−i+1)− piI−i,
10. The set Ii = {I − i+ 1, I − i+ 2 . . . , I}.
for all m∈Ii. From the IP property, we have:
V (σm, tI−i+1)− V (σm, tI−i)
≥V (σI−i+1, tI−i+1)− V (σI−i+1, tI−i),
for all m ∈ Ii, since σm ≥ σI−i+1 and tI−i+1 ≥
tI−i. By adding up the above two equations, (53) is
proved.
From (52), (49) and the property Vσ(σ, t) < 0, we
have:
V (σI−i, tI−i)− piI−i ≥V (σI−i, tm)− pim
≥V (σm, tm)− pim ≥ 0,
and (54) is proved.
2) Necessity.
Lemma 1 shows the necessity of the condition (4) in
Theorem 1. The condition (5) in Theorem 1 can be
derived from the IR constraint. The conditions (6)
and (7) can be proved by the IC constraints for types
σi and σi+1 (i.e., V (σi+1, ti+1)−pii+1 ≥ V (σi+1−pii)
and V (σi, ti)− pii ≥ V (σi, ti+1)− pii+1).
APPENDIX E
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Condition (22) is equivalent to the following two conditions
pik ≥ pik+1 + V (σ[max]k , tk)− V (σ[max]k , tk+1). (55)
pik ≤ pik+1 + V (σ[max]k , tk)− V (σ[max]k , tk+1). (56)
We first prove that the constraints in (55) and (56) are
sufficient and necessary conditions for the following two
constraints:
pik ≥ pik+1+V (σ, tk)−V (σ, tk+1), ∀σ ∈ [σ[max]k , σ[max]k+1 ].
(57)
pik ≤ pik+1+V (σ, tk)−V (σ, tk+1), ∀σ ∈ [σ[max]k−1 , σ[max]k ].
(58)
1) Sufficiency.
From (55), we have
V (σ
[max]
k , tk+1)− V (σ[max]k , tk) ≥ pik+1 − pik.
The IP property implies that
V (σ, tk+1)− V (σ, tk)
≥ V (σ[max]k , tk+1)− V (σ[max]k , tk),
∀σ ∈ [σ[max]k , σ[max]k+1 ],
⇒V (σ, tk+1)− V (σ, tk) ≥ pik+1 − pik,
∀σ ∈ [σ[max]k , σ[max]k+1 ].
Hence, (57) is proved. In addition, from (56), we
have
V (σ
[max]
k , tk+1)− V (σ[max]k , tk) ≤ pik+1 − pik.
The IP property implies that
V (σ, tk+1)− V (σ, tk)
≤ V (σ[max]k , tk+1)− V (σ[max]k , tk),
∀σ ∈ [σ[max]k−1 , σ[max]k ],
⇒V (σ, tk+1)− V (σ, tk) ≤ pik+1 − pik,
∀σ ∈ [σ[max]k−1 , σ[max]k ].
Hence, (58) is proved.
From the above derivations, we know that the con-
ditions in (55) and (56) are the sufficient conditions
of (57) and (58).
2) Necessity
Since σ[max]k ∈ [σ[max]k , σ[max]k+1 ] and σ[max]k ∈ [σ[max]k−1 ,
σ
[max]
k ], the necessity of the conditions in (55) and
(56) to the conditions in (57) and (58) can be ob-
tained directly.
By now, we have proved that the conditions in Theorem
2 are equivalent to the conditions (20), (21), (57) and (58).
From Theorem 1, we know that the IC and IR constraints
are equivalent to the conditions in (20), (21), (57) and (58).
Therefore, Theorem 2 is proved.
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Without loss of generality, we can let t∆q2 = xσ2, where
x ≥ 0.
When x > 1, we have σ2 < t∆q2 and the value of
t∆q2(σ2−t∆q2)
σ3(σ2+t∆q2) is negative. Hence, (37) is satisfied.
When x∈ [0, 1], we rewrite the formula t∆q2(σ2−t∆q2)σ3(σ2+t∆q2) as
x(1−x)
σ(1+x) . The second order derivative of
x(1−x)
1+x is − 4(1+x)3 ,
which is negative. Hence, the optimal solution xˆ that leads
to the maximum value of x(1−x)1+x satisfies
∂ x(1−x)1+x
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x=xˆ
= 0⇒ 1− 2xˆ− xˆ
2
(1 + xˆ)
2 = 0⇒ xˆ =
√
2− 1.
Therefore, the maximum value of x(1−x)1+x is 3−2
√
2. In other
words, the maximum value of t∆q
2(σ2−t∆q2)
σ3(σ2+t∆q2) is
3−2√2
σ and
(37) is satisfied.
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The first order derivative of
∑j
k=iQk(σ) with respect to σ
is
∂
∑j
k=iQk(σ)
∂σ
=
j∑
k=i
∂Qk(σ)
∂σ
= Ng(σ)
( j∑
k=i
Hk(σ) + C(tj+1)− C(ti)
)
,
where Hk(σ) is defined in (34). Since the first order
derivative of Hk(σ) is non-positive for all k, we have
∂
∑j
k=iHk(σ)
∂σ ≤ 0. Hence,
∑j
k=iHk(σ) crosses zero at most
once. Together with the facts that i) C(tj+1)−C(ti) is a con-
stant with respect to σ and ii) Ng(σ) is always positive, we
have the result that
∑j
k=iQk(σ) is unimodal with respect to
σ.
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The statement is trivial if σˆ1 = σˆ2, thus we focus on the case
of σˆ1 > σˆ2.
The statement can be proved if for arbitrary σ1 < σ2,
we can find a σ∗ such that
∑2
k=1Qk(σ
∗) >
∑2
k=1Qk(σk).
There are two possible cases of σ2: 1) σ2 ≥ σˆ1, and 2) σ2 <
σˆ1.
For the case that σ2 ≥ σˆ1. Since σˆ1 is the optimal solution
of Q1(σ1), we have Q1(σˆ1) ≥ Q1(σ1) for any σ1. Since σ2 >
σˆ1 > σˆ2 and Q2 is a unimodal function, we have
∂Q2(σ2)
∂σ2
≤
0 for any σ2 > σˆ2, which means that Q2(σˆ1) ≥ Q2(σ2).
Therefore, by letting σ∗ = σˆ1, we have
∑2
k=1Qk(σ
∗) >∑2
k=1Qk(σk).
For the case that σ2 < σˆ1, by letting σ∗ = σ2, we have∑2
k=1Qk(σ
∗) >
∑2
k=1Qk(σk). This is because σ1 < σ2 <
σˆ1 and Q1 is a unimodal function, which implies that 1)
∂Q1(σ1)
∂σ1
≥ 0 for any σ1 < σ2, and 2) Q1(σ∗) = Q1(σ2) ≥
Q1(σ1).
APPENDIX I
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
First, we rewrite the formula x1−e−x as
x
1− e−x = 1 +
e−x + x− 1
1− e−x .
Proposition 5 is proved if e−x + x − 1 ≥ 0. Since the first
order derivative of e−x + x− 1 is 1− e−x, which is positive
for any x > 0, the minimum value of e−x + x − 1 is then
lower bounded by e−0 + 0− 1 = 0.
